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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FLORENCE GILLMOR, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
____________________________) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 16023 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a suit for a declaratory judgment relating to 
options to renew leases. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court made and entered a summary judgment 
declaring that certain leases of land to appellant will terminate 
on December 31, 1978. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order reversing the judgment of the 
trial court and remanding the case for a full trial on the merits. 
-1-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff is the owner of an undivided one-half 
interest and the defendant is the owner of an undivided one-
fourth interest in some 32,000 acres of land located in several 
counties in Utah. In 1969 one Edward L. Gillmor, the father of 
the plaintiff, leased to the defendant and to one Stephen T. 
Gillmor, his undivided one-half interest in some 7,192 acres of 
land in Salt Lake County by a separate written lease, and similarly 
leased to the defendant some 17,395 acres in Summit County and 
some 6,753 acres in Tooele County. The leases mentioned above 
are attached to the Complaint as Exhibits C, D and E (R 45-61). 
This lease relates only to the Summit and Tooele Counties property. 
The term of each lease is 10 years with the following 
option to renew: 
"THE LESSEES have the option to extend this lease 
for a period of two years_ upon the expiration of 
this lease, provided the ownership of this property 
is vested in the present Lessor." 
The complaint, insofar as it is pertinent here, alleges 
that Stephen T. Gillmor assigned to the defendant his interest in 
the lease on or about September 18, 1972; that each lease ter-
minates on November 15, 1978, subject to certain exceptions con-
tained in the lease; that notices of termination of the leases 
on November 15, 1978, were given to the defendant in 1974 and 
1976; that the present Lessor referred to in the leases is Edward 
L. Gillmor and that he died on or about January 8, 1970; and 
that the defendant may not exercise the extension option quoted 
above because the ownership of the leased land is no longer vested 
-2-
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in Edward L. Gillmor (R. 3). See amendment to the complaint 
correcting the name of Edward L. Gillmor to Edward Lincoln 
Gillmor (R 65, 66). 
It is stated in the Salt Lake County lease that 
Florence Gillmor is the daughter of the Lessor, Edward Lincoln 
Gillmor (R. 49) 
The answer to the complaint denies that the leases 
terminate on November 14, 1978; denies for lack of information that 
the plaintiff is the successor to Edward Lincoln Gillmor; denies 
that the defendant may not exercise the option for renewal and 
denies that " ... the defendant's interest in all three leases is 
cancelled and terminated effective November 15, 1978 .... " (R. 67,68). 
The plaintiff moved" ... the court for su=ary judgment 
on her complaint herein ... " basing it upon the pleadings and 
upon a memorandum of points and authorities to be submitted. 
No grounds for the motion are stated (R. 69) . 
Briefs were filed and the trial court made and entered 
a summary judgment stating that as a matter of law the defendant 
has no right to extend his interest in the Summit County and 
Tooele County leases and that they shall expire on December 31, 
1978. The motion was denied as to the Salt Lake County lease. 
(R. 136, 137). 
This appeal was taken from the summary judgment granting 
the motion as to the two leases mentioned. 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THERE ARE WELL RECOGNIZED RESTRICTIONS 
TO THE GRANTING OF MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
This is a suit for a declaratory judgment and although 
the authority of the court to grant relief is broad there are 
certain well-recognized restrictions: 
a. There must be an existing controversy between 
parties having adverse legal interests. 
b. Advisory op~nions cannot be given. 
c. A judgment should not be given when there 
are ongoing activities which may change the 
factual situation. 
These will be discussed in the order stated. 
The law is well summarized in the case of Norvell vs. 
Sangre de Cristo Development Co., USCA lOth Circuit, 519 F2d, 370 
at page 378. We quote: 
"We cannot render advisory opinions on unknown 
facts. Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. 
v. United States, 404 F.2d 1066 (lOth C~r. 1968); 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma v. Dulick, supra. 
-4-
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"~inally, we hold that declaratory judgments 
are.Lmproper when, as here, ongoing activity may 
radLcally change the factual situation. In Mechling 
Barge Lines v. United States, 368 U.S. 324, 82 s.Ct. 
337, .7 L.Ed.2d 317 (1961), the Supreme Court, in 
holdLng that declaratory judgment is a remedy 
committed to judicial discretion, held, inter alia: 
'We think that sound discretion with-
holds the remedy where it appears that a 
challenged 'continuing practice' is, at 
th7 moment adjudication is sought, under-
goLng significant modification so that its 
ultimate form cannot be confidently predicted.' 
368 U.S. 324 at 331, 82 S.Ct. 337 at 341. "' 
"An option to renew a lease amounts to 
no more than a covenant to grant an additional 
term. It is a mere continuing offer not binding 
until accepted." 
Thompson on Real Property, Vol. 3, Section 1119, p. 421. 
See also Majer v. Layfmen, (NJ) 53 Atl 2d 187 
Cincinelli v. Iwasaki (Cal) 338 P2d 1005, 1010. 
Unless and until the lessee exercises the option, the 
"continuing offer" referred to in Thompson is not accepted and there 
is nothing for the court to construe. There is no actual contro-
versy and the plaintiff is simply asking the court for legal 
advice which the court cannot give. 
Also, this is a case where there are ongoing facts of 
the type mentioned in the Norvell case, supra. The plaintiff has 
attached to the complaint voluminous findings of fact, conclusions 
of law and a judgment in the partition suit involving the leased 
property now on appeal. The case is on appeal and in view of 
the silence of the lease as to the effect thereon of partition, 
we submit that the suit and appeal are ongoing facts which should 
be considered under the cases cited. In this case, the factual 
-5-
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situation of the parties may, as a result of the judgment and appeal, 
be entirely changed at the end of the term and when the option is 
exercised. 
II 
A COVENANT TO RENEW A LEASE RUNS WITH THE LAND. 
An option to renew a lease has sometimes been considered 
to be a condition and sometimes to be a covenant. 
It is stated in Buffalo Ins. Co. v. Bommarito, 42 F2d, 53: 
"A general rule of construction is that in 
case of doubt as to whether a provision in a 
lease or an agreement to extend a lease is a 
covenant or condition, it is to be construed 
as a covenant. " 
A covenant to extend a lease runs with the land and 
in case the lessor or one of the lessors dies, as in this case, 
it is enforceable against those who succeed to the title of the 
deceased. 
O'Connor v. Chiascione (Conn.) 33 Atl. 2d 336. 
Dana v. Dana, 157 N.E. 623 
Judkins v. Charette, (Mass.) 151 N.E. 81 
Cincinelli v. Iwasaki, (Cal.) 338 P2d 1005. 
51C C.J.S. Page 180 
The law is that a covenant to extend or renew a lease 
is not personal unless the instrument makes it so, is well 
expressed in the case of Taylor v. King Cole Theaters, 183 Va. 
117, 31 S.E. 2d 260: 
"In addition to the fact that the original 
lessors .had solemnly covenanted not to enter 
into a new lease with the appellants or others, 
the general law is that covenants to renew a 
lease are not personal, in the absence of an 
agreement making them so, but run with the 
-6-
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land. The legal successors of the lessor and 
the lessee are entitled to the benefits and 
ar~ burdened with the duties and obligations 
wh~ch such covenants confer and impose on the 
original parties." 
III 
THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS. 
The courts have held almost uniformly that where there 
is a question of the intentions of the parties to a written instru-
ment which cannot be determined with certainty from the instrument 
itself, a motion for a summary judgment should be denied. The 
reasoning behind this rule is that any inqui:?::->' in :o surrounding 
circumstances to determine intention involves questions of 
material fact. 
The rule is well stated in the case of Ackerman v. 
Mohawk Cabinet Co., 322 NYS 2d 396: 
"Where the intent of the parties is not 
unequivocally clear, intent must be gleaned 
from sense in which the words were used, 
relations of parties, resolution of conflict-
ing interests, if any, surrounding circumstances; 
this inquiry involves both questions of law and 
fact and is not properly dealt with by summary 
judgment." (emphasis added) 
In the case of Fulton v. Clark, (Mont.) 538 P.2d 1371, 
1374, the court said: 
"Summary judgment is usually ~napprop:iate 
where the intent of the contract~ng part~es 
is an important consideration." 
We quote from the California case of Lynch v. Spilman, 
431 P.2d 636, 646: 
" ... In Walsh v. \<lalsh, (1941) , 18 Cal. 2d 439, 
-7-
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here." 
In this case there is no evidence of facts or circum-
stances surrounding the execution of the lease and the court 
should not permit the drastic procedure of summary judgment to be 
substituted for a trial. 
The limitations on the application of Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. 
are well pointed out in the case of Judkins v. Toone, 27 Utah 2d 
17, 492 P.2d 980 as follows: 
"We recognize and commend the usefulness of 
Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P., which authorizes the granting 
of a summary judgment under the circumstances provided 
in the rule: 'if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law.' If this condition 
is met the granting of the summary judgment has the 
salutary purpose of eliminating the time, trouble 
and expense of a trial, when upon the best showing 
a party could possibly make, he nevertheless would 
not.be entitled to prevail. 
"However, as this court observed in the case of 
Dupler v. Yates: 
'Rule-56 U.R.C.P. is not intended to 
provide a substitute for the regular trial 
of cases in which there are disputed issues 
of fact upon which the outcome of the litiga-
tion depends. And it should be invoked with 
caution to the end that litigants may be 
afforded a trial where there exists between 
them a bona fide dispute of material fact.' 
-8-
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"This doctrine of law has been reaffirmed many 
times by this court. A good example is its ex-
pression in the case of Frederick May & Company 
v. Dunn: 
'To sustain a summary judgment, the 
pleadings, evidence, admissions ... must 
show that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact, and that the winner is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of. 
law. Such showing must preclude, as a 
matter of law, all reasonable possibility 
that the loser could win if given a trial.'" 
IV 
THE COMPLICATIONS OF COTENANCY SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE COURT 
It will be noted that the leases involved in this appeal 
cover only an undivided one-half interest in the land described 
and as stated in the findings of fact in the partition suit 
attached to the complaint (Exhibit B, R. 17) that the defendant 
owns an undivided one-fourth interest and that Charles F. Gillmor 
owns an undivided one-fourth interest. They are tenants in common. 
The law is that each tenant in common owns an undivided 
fraction in the whole, being entitled to an interest in every inch 
of the property. 86 C.J.S. p. 362. 
A tenant in common may lease his undivided interest and 
the lessee, as such, would become a tenant in common with the 
other cotenants. 86 C.J.S. P.523. 
"A tenant in common may, without the consent of 
his cotenants, convey or dispose of his undivided 
interest in the common property as long as he does 
not prejudice the rights of his cotenants in the 
premises." 86 C.J.S. 531. 
-9-
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There is nothing in the record before the court as to 
the status of the one-fourth interest in the land owned by Charles 
F. Gillmor. Exhibit B to the complaint (R. pp. 13-43) indicates 
the magnitude, great differences, and complications inherent in 
the use of the leased land. We believe, and earnestly urge that 
a court considering whether the inheritance of the interest of 
Edward L. Gillmor by his daughter constituted a change of owner-
ship within the meaning of the renewal provision which would deny 
the defendant his option to renew under the facts and circumstances 
disclosed by the pleadings, including Exhibit B. 
If, for example, the court should hold that the renewal 
option was not effective in Tooele, and Summit Counties as to 
plaintiff's one-half interest, the defendant would still be in 
possession of "every inch of the property" by virtue of his 
status of cotenant. The plaintiff would be entitled under the law 
to an equal right to every square inch. From a practical standpoint 
the end result of the granting of summary judgment would be total 
confusion. 
The fact that the plaintiff owns a one-half interest and 
the defendant owns a one-fourth interest does not change the 
basic law that each has an interest in each inch with equal rights 
of possession. 
The rule has been stated as follows in 86 C.J.S. P. 363: 
"Tenants in corranon are seized 'per my et per tout' 
although it has also been said that tenants in common 
are seized 'per my' and not 'per tout'. Each tenant 
has been held to own an undivided fraction, and each 
is entitled before severance to an interest in every 
inch of the soil; but no one of them is entitled to 
the exclusive possession of any particular part of 
the land, each being entitled to occupy the whole in 
-10-
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common with the others or to receive his share of 
the rents and profits and the undivided interest of a 
tenant in common has been held to be intangible and 
incorporeal." 
In view of the obvious complications of ownership and 
possession, the whole factual situation of the parties should 
have been considered. The trial court erred in granting the motion 
for summary judgment. 
v 
OPTIONS TO RENEW A LEASE ARE CONSTRUED 
MOST STRONGLY AGAINST THE LESSOR. 
The law is well settled that options to renew or extend 
the term of a lease are construed most strongly against the lessor 
and in favor of the lessee. 
Thompson on Real Property, 1959 Replacement 
Vol. 3, Section 1119, page 421. 
Podol vs. Jacobs, 65 Ariz. 50, 173 P2d 758. 
McAulay vs. Jones, 110 Cal. App. 2d 302, 242 P2 650. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the order of the trial 
court granting the plaintiff's motion for a summary judgment should 
be reversed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
E. J:SEN 
SKEEN AND SKEEN 
536 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
-11-
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